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RECENT CASES
to conceal these payments to the wife, "... it is commendable that they were
straightforward about it."4 0
This decision leaves unresolved the uncertainties surrounding separation
agreements in New York. The Court has reaffirmed the broad "direct tendency"
rule of Rhinelander. The task of deciding whether a particular agreement vio-
lates the statutory prohibition against contracts "to alter or dissolve the mar-
riage" remains with the trier of fact and he must approach this determination
with but a bare indication of the applicable legal standard. Those agreements
which are part of a plan to obtain or facilitate a divorce must be condemned, but
only if they "directly" tend to dissolve the marriage. The Court rejected the more
rigid legal rule that would test the validity of such agreements by the presence
of some undue benefit to one party. Considering the equitable origin of these
agreements and the unique relationship of the parties who enter into them, it
is perhaps not possible to establish an absolute measure of their validity. The
Court, cognizant of the impossibility of establishing a strict legal standard that
would insure an equitable result in every case, left the final decision to the
discretion of the fact finder. Practical human experience, more so than any
legal "test," can best ascribe the proper force to be given the various factual
elements in each case. However, it is not a mere academic wish for symmetry
and exactness that prompts the desire for a more explicit standard by which
these agreements may be interpreted. There is a very real and practical need
for clarification of what may be provided in a separation agreement under
New York law. In the present state of uncertainty New York residents who
have settled their marital differences by contract and who wish to insure that
such an agreement will not be upset by a New York court as promotive of
divorce, are forced to incorporate the separation agreement in a divorce action
brought in another state. The foreign divorce decree will then act as a binding
adjudication of the validity of the incorporated separation agreement. 41 Such
a burdensome and undesirable procedure could be eliminated to a great extent
by a clearer interpretation of the presently ambiguous language of the law gov-
erning separation agreements in New York.
PAUL T. MURRAY
LIBEL AND SLANDER
JUDICIAL EXTENSION or ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGE IN DEFAMATION
The plaintiff, an appraiser for the City of New York, submitted an appraisal
report of certain land known as Edgemere Park, located in the Borough of
Queens. At the time, the city was planning to condemn and purchase the land
described in the report. Shortly thereafter, in March of 1958, the defendant,
40. Ibid.
41. Hess v. Hess, 276 N.Y. 486, 12 N.E.2d 170 (1937); Hoyt v. Hoyt, 265 App. Div.
223, 38 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1st Dep't 1942).
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then serving as President of the Borough of Queens and as a member of the
Board of Estimate, also submitted a report to the Mayor concerning the City's
acquisition by condemnation of real property located in his borough. In his
report, the defendant sharply criticized plaintiff's report, stating that it was
incredible ". . that the City's appraiser [plaintiff] could have reached the
conclusions set forth in his appraisal report except on the basis of misinforma-
tion, ignorance, distortion and incompetence."1 Moreover, the defendant re-
quested that the plaintiff be removed from the panel of appraisers of the City of
New York. Since there was considerable public interest in the subject of
condemnation at this time, the press eagerly awaited release of this report.
Some three months after defendant had made his report he made a copy of it
available to newspaper reporters. This libel action was based on the references
to the plaintiff in both the report to the Mayor and to the newspapers. The
defendant, after joinder of issue, moved for summary judgment on the ground
that he was absolutely privileged as a matter of law to make the defamatory 2
statements. The Supreme Court denied the motion, the Appellate Division
affirmed the orders and an appeal was taken with three questions certified: (1)
Did the Appellate Division properly affirm the denial of motion for summary
judgment; (2) did the record establish as a matter of law that the alleged
defamatory statements were absolutely privileged; and (3) were they qualifiedly
privileged so as to render the defendant immune from liability? The Court of
Appeals held, that a Borough President is absolutely privileged to make defama-
tory statements about a lesser city official so long as it is done within the scope
of his official duties. It further said that even if the Borough President were
only qualifiedly privileged to make the defamatory statements there was
insufficient evidence in this case from which a jury might infer malice.4
Sheridan v. Crisona, 14 N.Y.2d 108, 198 N.E.2d 359, 249 N.Y.S.2d 161 (1964).
Under federal decisions it has long been held that an executive official is
absolutely privileged to publish false and defamatory matter of another in the
exercise of his executive function if the matter has some relation to the pro-
ceeding in which the official is acting.5 In the most recent case involving
absolute privilege the Supreme Court extended the privilege to the Director of
the Office of Rent Stabilization, protecting him from a libel suit arising out of
1. Sheridan v. Crisona, 14 N.Y.2d 108, 111, 198 N.E.2d 359, 360, 249 N.Y.S.2d 161,
162 (1964).
2. See 3 Restatement, Torts, § 559 (1938).
3. Sheridan v. Crisona, 18 A.D.2d 1140 (2d Dep't 1963) (memorandum decision).
4. For judicial definitions of malice see Hoeppner v. Dunkirk Printing Co., 254 N.Y.
95, 106, 172 N.E. 139, 142 (1930) (personal spite or ill-will, or culpable recklessness or
negligence) and Loewinthan v. LeVine, 270 App. Div. 512, 519, 60 N.Y.S.2d 433, 438
(1st Dep't 1946) (wanton and reckless disregard of the rights of another).
5. See, e.g., Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959) (Director of Office of Rent Stabiliza-
tion); Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896) (Postmaster General); Glass v. Ickes, 117
F.2d 273 (D.C. Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 718 (1941) (Secretary of Interior);
Mellon v. Brewer, 18 F.2d 168 (D.C. Cir. 1927) (Secretary of Treasury). See also 3 Re-
statement, Torts, § 591 (1938).
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statements he had made about two employees in a press release.6 The basis for
this privilege is that in exercising the function of his office an executive, keep-
ing within the limits of his authority, should be free from the fear that his
motives may become the subject of inquiry in a civil suit for damages. Such
restraint would seriously cripple the proper and effective administration of
public affairs.7
In this state, absolute privilege has been given to judicial proceedings,
legislative proceedings and executive communications. 8 The circumstances under
which absolute privilege is available to officials of political subdivisions have
been variously expressed both with relation to the nature of the occasion and
the subject matter of the communication. In some instances the particular
statement must be pertinent to the subject under discussion.9 The trend has
been away from conferment of the privilege on the basis of rank and toward
conferment on the basis of the duties the official is expected to perform.'- The
doctrine of immunity is based upon "considerations of public policy and to
secure the unembarrassed and efficient administration of justice and public
affairs."" It has been held to include "official reports and communications by
or to the executive head of a department of the government."' 2 If these reports
and communications are in the nature of an official proceeding, a fair and true
report of them can be published without fear of liability.13
The defense of absolute privilege is lost if the alleged defamatory statements
were made by an official when not acting within the scope of his official duties.
To decide when an official is acting within the scope of his powers may be a
difficult. factual determination. A general guideline seems to be that the occa-
sion would have justified the act if the official had been using his power for
any of the purposes on whose account it was vested in him. 4" In a decision' 5
cited by the majority in the instant case, the Court found for the plaintiff
when the defendant, then State Conservation Commissioner, accused him of
deliberate sabotage or gross neglect in his conduct with relation to a wildlife
experiment. The remarks were made to a group of sportsmen and civic leaders
in an after dinner speech. The rationale of the Court was that the privilege
should not be extended to comments made in the course of an after dinner
speech to people who can do nothing about the alleged gross neglect.' 6 The same
6. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959); Jaffee, Suits Against Government and
Officers: Damage Actions, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 209, 234-35 (1963)..
7. Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498 (1896).
8. Peeples v. State, 179 Misc. 272, 38 N.Y.S.2d 690 (Ct. Cl. 1942); see also 3 Restate-
ment, Torts, §§ 585, 590, 591 (1938).
9. See Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 941 (1955).
10. Prosser, Torts 612 (2d ed. 1955).
11. Hemmens v. Nelson, 138 N.Y. 517, 523, 34 N.E. 342, 344 (1893).
12. Ibid.
13. N.Y. Civil Rights Law § 74.
14. Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949).
15. Cheatum v. Wehle, 5 N.Y.2d 585, 159 N.E.2d 166, 186 N.Y.S.2d 606 (1959).
•16. Id. at 593, 159 N.E.2d at 170, 186 N.Y.S.2d at 612.
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reasoning was applied by the Appellate Division in a later case 7 in which the
Court said "It is not alleged that the words were in the nature of an official
report, or uttered pursuant to any duty of office, or that they were addressed to
anyone empowered to receive them or act upon them."'I s The Attorney General
had made statements about the plaintiff to a newspaper reporter during a pre-
liminary investigation of the plaintiff company. The privilege is not extended
to cover informal statements or assertions by public officers concerning their
investigations.' 9
The majority of the Court based its decision on the belief, often expressed
in prior cases,20 that executive officials of the state should be able to make
reports to various branches of the government without fear of reprisal by a
civil suit for damages. Proceeding from this premise they apply the same
general considerations of public policy to a municipal executive, such as a
Borough President.2l Contrary to the trend Dean Prosser discusses, 22 the Court
confers absolute privilege because the Borough President is charged with "sub-
stantial responsibilities," not because the duties imposed would otherwise expose
him to civil reprisal. This is especially true in view of the fact that the de-
fendant's authority for making an investigation of condemnation proceedings
is derived from his place on the Board of Estimate28 and even this basis is
not absolutely clear.24 After establishing defendant's right to protection under
the privilege, the Court found that his release of the report (to the newspapers)
was within its scope because he was obligated to make the report available to
the public on demand. 25 In a dissenting opinion, Judge Dye questions the means
by which this privilege is being extended and the advisability of extending it.
In reference to the first point he states that absolute privilege has been available
through constitutional sources and by statute, not through decisional law.20
More important to the whole consideration of absolute privilege is Judge Dye's
reluctance to extend it. He does not find it necessary to give state officials
more than a qualified privilege since they are "more likely to be responsive
to the wishes of the public if they are required to account for their malicious
falsehoods."2 7 Judge Dye's conclusion is based on the belief that absolute
privilege, or lack of it, does not greatly affect a public official's discharge of his
official duties.
17. Goodyear Aluminum Products Inc. v. State, 12 A.D.2d 692, 207 N.Y.S.2d 904
(3d Dep't 1960).
18. Id. at 693, 207 N.Y.S.2d at 905.
19. Kelley v. Hearst Corp., 2 A.D.2d 480, 484, 157 N.Y.S.2d 498, 502 (3d Dep't 1956).
20. Cheatum v. Wehle, 5 N.Y.2d 585, 159 N.E.2d 166, 186 N.Y.S.2d 606 (1959);
Manceri v. City of New York, 12 A.D.2d 895, 209 N.Y.S.2d 915 (1st Dep't 1961); Hyman
v. Press Publishing Co., 199 App. Div. 609, 192 N.Y.Supp. 47 (1st Dep't 1922).
21. Instant case at 112, 198 N.E.2d at 361, 249 N.Y.S.2d at 163.
22. Prosser, Torts 612 (2d ed. 1955).
23. New York City Charter, § 384 (1936).
24. judge Dye's dissent in the instant case at 115, 198 N.E.2d at 362, 249 N.Y.S.2d at
166.
25. New York City Charter, § 893 (1936).
26. Instant case at 116, 198 N.E.2d at 362, 249 N.Y.S.2d at 167.
27. Instant case at 116, 198 N.E.2d at 363, 249 N.Y.S.2d at 167.
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The Court of Appeals has held that a municipal executive is absolutely
privileged to make defamatory statements in the exercise of his official duties.
While the Court's reasoning is clear it is difficult to predict how far absolute
privilege will be extended in this area. The responsibilities of the official in-
volved are an important factor but the court gives no clue as to the amount of
responsibility necessary for conferment of the privilege. Trying to find criteria
from further reasoning of the Court, one could come to the conclusion that
the privilege will be extended to any official who is required to make a report
to another official or branch of the government. Even further, from the facts
of this case, the decision could be interpreted to mean that an official is privi-
leged in any report which is within his discretion to make. Whether or not
the Court will extend this privilege is not ascertainable but its language in this
case certainly suggests the possibility. In its disposal of the issue of defendant's
release of the report to the newspapers, the Court finds this within the scope
of the privilege because members of the public could gain access to the docu-
ment on demand.2 8 While this may be a valid reason for protecting the official
if the report happens to be printed, it does not seem to be an adequate or
logical reason for allowing him to advertise it, which this decision in effect
gives him license to do. The protection of this privilege has been limited (on
the basis of what has been though to be for the public good) to remarks made
by legislators in the course of debates, the reports of military officers to their
superiors, to official acts of state and to statements made by counsel, judge,
parties or witnesses in proceedings in court or for use in such proceedings, and
in proceedings before tribunals and officers having the judicial attributes of a
court.-° To extend this privilege to government officials at the state level
covering reports made in the course of their duties (but possibly not required)
seems unwarranted. It is difficult to see why a qualified privilege is not ade-
quate protection since the privilege is only lost when the allegedly defamatory
statements are motivated by ill-will8 0 or for a purpose not within the privilege.
If an official acts in such a way as to lose the protection of a qualified privilege,
his actions will be at least as detrimental to the operation of an efficient
government as is the fear by its officials of civil reprisal. The latter considera-
tion is the most cogent reason for this decision.
ROBERT KELLER
28. Bradford v. Pette, 204 Misc. 308 (Sup. Ct. 1953).
29. Roberts v. Pratt, 174 Misc. 585, 587, 21 N.Y.S.2d 545, 548 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
30. Andrews v. Gardiner, 224 N.Y. 440, 446, 121 N.E. 341, 344 (1918).
